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Abstract. We study atomic routing games where every agent travels
both along its decided edges and through time. The agents arriving on
an edge are first lined up in a first-in-first-out queue and may wait: an
edge is associated with a capacity, which defines how many agents-per-
time-step can pop from the queue’s head and enter the edge, to transit
for a fixed delay. We show that the best-response optimization problem is
not approximable, and that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium
is complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Then, we
drop the rationality assumption, introduce a behavioral concept based on
GPS navigation, and study its worst-case efficiency ratio to coordination.
Keywords: Routing Games over Time, Complexity, Price of Anarchy
1 Introduction
Numerous selfish agents use a routing network to take shortest paths that may
however congest the paths of others. Routing games model such conflictual sys-
tems by a graph of vertices and edges, and every agent decides a path from a
source to a sink, path which cost is congestion-dependent. Routing games find
applications in road traffic [War52], as well as in routing packets of data via In-
ternet Protocol [KP99]. Founding results(a) have been obtained on static routing
games [RT02, Rou05, CK05, AAE05, NRTV07, Rou09], where each individual
path instantaneously occurs everywhere over its decided edges. Such instanta-
neousness does not reflect that an agent on one edge of its path is not elsewhere,
and cannot congest other edges. Routing games over time, where every agent
travels along its route as well as through time, were introduced more recently
[KS09, AU09]. Introducing time makes games more complicated: pure-strategy
Nash equilibria are often not guaranteed; problems such as computing a best-
response or an equilibrium are hard; the Price of Anarchy (PoA) can be large.
We study asymmetric atomic routing games over integer time-steps that
model congestion with a very natural first-in-first-out (FIFO) queuing policy
on the edges [WHK14]. Every edge e has an integer fixed delay de and an integer
capacity ce. On an edge, every arriving agent is lined up in the edge’s FIFO
queue (a discrete list); the capacity defines how many agents-per-time-step can
pop from the queue’s head and transit through the edge, while the others wait
the next time-step. Every agent aims at minimizing the time from source to sink.
(a) Static routing games were a crucial testbed for the Price of Anarchy, a concept that
bounds a game’s loss of efficiency due to selfish behaviors.
Related Work. Only pure Nash equilibria (PNE) are considered here. It is
the same (resp. different) source/sink in the symmetric (resp. asymmetric) case.
[HHP06, HHP09] studies multicommodity routing problems, where asymmet-
ric commodities are routed sequentially and the cost of edges is load dependent.
With affine costs, while in the splittable case the PoA is almost 4, in the un-
splittable case, computing a best-response is NP-hard, and the PoA is 3 + 2
√
2.
[FOV08] observes that “a car traversing a road can only cause congestion
delays to those cars that use the road at a later time” and proposes an asymmetric
model where every edge has a priority on agents, agents that are congested only
by those with a higher priority on the edge. While a global priority (same fixed
priority for every edge) guarantees the existence of a PNE, local priorities do
not. Several (matching) bounds are derived on the PoA.
[KS09, KS11] introduces competitive flows over time, by building a non-
atomic symmetric model upon the literature about deterministic queuing. Every
edge has a fixed transit delay, and a capacity that bounds above the edge’s
outflow. It is shown that a sequence of ε-Nash flows converges (as ε → 0) to
a Nash flow; and an iterative algorithm is proposed. While the evacuation-PoA
can be arbitrarily large, the time-PoA is in O(1).
[AU09] proposes a dynamic selfish routing model with non-atomic asymmet-
ric agents. A very general delay function de(x,H
t
e) of the demand x and the
historic Hte is introduced, along with a generalized notion of FIFO, which just
states that there are no crossovers. Concurrently to [KS09], it is shown that
in the symmetric case, a PNE always exists and can be computed efficiently.
However, in the asymmetric case and under a specification of FIFO where an
entering agent waits the previous one’s end of transit, it is shown that an equi-
librium may not exist, and the PoA is bounded below by the number of vertices.
Flow independent delays can be reduced to static flows, providing a PoA bound.
[HMRT09, HMRT11] proposes temporal (asymmetric and atomic) network
congestion games. Every edge has a speed ae ∈ R>0 (latency equals speed times
weight of agents being processed), and different local policies are studied. Under
FIFO, an edge processes a unitary agent in time ae, while the other agents wait.
A guaranteed PNE can be computed efficiently for the unweighted symmetric
case, despite the NP-hardness of computing a best-response. In the weighted or
asymmetric cases, an equilibrium may not exist. One could reduce one of our
edges e to ce × de speedy-edges having ae = 1, but it is pseudo-polynomial.
Conversely, it is also unclear how we could reduce this model to the present one.
Our model is the same as in [WHK14], an atomic variation over integer
time-steps of [KS09], where every edge has a free-flow delay and a capacity that
bounds above the inflow-per-time-step. In [WHK14], the emphasis is rather on
bottleneck individual objectives, but also on the sum on the edges in the path.
A PNE may not exist; Computing a best-response is NP-complete; Verifying a
PNE is coNP-complete; Deciding PNE existence is at least NP-hard. Also, a
bound is provided on the PoA. [WBK15] studies games where agents are robust
bottleneck optimizers that only know an interval about the cost of edges and
learn the actual cost later.
[HPSVK16] studies a model similar to [WHK14] and ours, but instead of
FIFO, studies local and overall priorities on the edges. (Crossovers may occur.)
Some bounds on the price of stability and PoA are derived. Computing opti-
mal priority lists is shown APX-hard. Under local priorities, computing best-
responses is NP-hard, as well as computing a PNE.
Furthermore, [MLS10, MLS13] generalizes Braess’s Paradox to the model in
[KS09], and Braess’s ratio can be much more severe. [BFA15] considers a model in
the fashion of [KS09] and shows that under a Stackelberg strategy, the time-PoA
is (1− 1/e)−1, and the total-delay-PoA is 2(1− 1/e)−1. [CCCW17a, CCCW17b]
propose an extensive form model where agents take new decisions on each vertex.
Results. In this paper’s model [WHK14, sum objective], the new results are
marked here with a star∗:
Th.1 A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist (b).
Th.2 The payoffs are well defined and calculable in polynomial-time (c).
Th.3 ∗ The best-response decision problem is NP-complete (d) (e) (f).
Th.4 ∗ The best-response optimization problem is APX-hard,
Th.5 ∗ and it is NP-hard to approximate within |V | 16−ε, and within n 17−ε.
Th.6 Verification of equilibria is coNP-complete(g).
Th.7 ∗ Existence of equilibria is ΣP2 -complete
(h).
That best-responses are not approximable, deeply questions the rationality
assumption of PNE. We then introduce a behavioral model for vehicles taking
decisions by GPS, inspired by how navigation assistants work: by retrieving
information on the current traffic and recomputing shortest paths in real-time.
On the worst-case efficiency ratio of GPS navigation, to coordination, we found:
Th.8 ∗ Allowing walks(i) as strategies, GPS-agents may cycle infinitely.
Th.9 ∗ The Price of GPS Navigation is in Ω(|V |+n) as the number of vertices
|V | and the number of agents n grow.
Model Discussion. The positioning of waiting queues on the edges’ tails,
and of fixed-delays inside edges, is without much loss of generality. Indeed, this
choice reduces in polynomial time from/to models where the queue occurs after
the fixed delay, where queues are on the nodes and fixed delays on the edges,
where edges are unoriented, etc. Furthermore, one can model starting times by
(b) [WHK14, App. B.1, Fig. B.11] contains a similar result. For culture and the pleasure
of the eyes, we include a close didactic counter-example in our Preliminaries.
(c) A close Dijkstra-style algorithm for local priorities lies in [HPSVK16, Prop2.2].
(d) Theorem 3 differs from [HMRT09, Sec. 3.1] where edges instead only have a speed.
(e) Not addressed in [WHK14, Appendix B], but for bottleneck [WHK14, Cor. 4].
(f) Our reduction from problem MinVertexCover is the base of Th. 4, 6 and 7.
(g) Theorem 6 differs from [WHK14, Cor. 4], where the objectives are bottlenecks.
[WHK14, Sec. 7] claims that one can derive NP-hardness for sum-objectives. Theo-
rems 2 and 3 enable to obtain coNP-completeness, which is then partly novel.
(h) As a ΣP2 -completeness result, Th. 7 clearly improves on the NP-hardness shown in
[WHK14, App. B.3, Th. 19].
(i) A walk is an alternating sequence of vertices and edges, consistent with the given
(di)graph, and that allows repetitions and infiniteness.
adding edges, and bottlenecks by delay de = 0 edges. One can also note that on
each edge e, delay ⌊(|qe| − 1)/ce⌋+ de is almost an affine function of congestion
|qe| (the queue’s length). Since the unweighted agents case that we consider is a
particular case of the weighted case (and Algorithm 1 adapts), our complexity
results and efficiency lower bounds extend to weighted agents.
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1. A First-in-first-out Routing Game (Frog) is a non-cooperative
finite game characterized by tuple Γ = (G = (V,E), (ce, de)e∈E , N, (si, s
∗
i )i∈N ,≻).
– G = (V,E) is a finite digraph with vertices V and edges E ⊆ V × V .
– Given edge e ∈ E, positive number ce ∈ N≥1 is the capacity of edge e, and
non-negative number de ∈ N≥0 is the fixed delay on edge e.
– Finite set N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents.
– Given agent i ∈ N , vertices si, s∗i ∈ V are its source vertex and sink vertex.
– Strict order ≻ on set N is a tie-breaking priority on agents.
For a given Frog, we introduce the following notations. For every agent
i, its strategy-set Pi consists of every simple path πi from source vertex si to
sink vertex s∗i . A strategy-profile (π1, . . . , πn) ∈ P1×· · ·×Pn, which for short we
denote in bold by pi ∈ P, defines a strategy for every agent. For a given strategy-
profile pi ∈ P; strategy πi is the strategy of agent i therein (a simple path from
si to s
∗
i ); adversary strategy-profile pi−i ∈
∏
j 6=i Pj consists of all strategies in pi
but agent i’s; and given strategy π′i, strategy-profile (π
′
i,pi−i) ∈ P is obtained
from strategy-profile pi by changing strategy πi into π
′
i.
Agents travel both along edges and through time. For an agent i, total delay
Ci : P → N≥0 is a function of the strategy-profile, defined as follows. As depicted
in Fig. 1, when agent i arrives on edge e ∈ πi, it lines up in a first-in-first-
out (FIFO) queue specific to edge e. At each time-step, edge e lets the ce first
agents in the queue enter the edge to transit for de time steps. Let function
wi,e : P → N≥0 be the time spent waiting by agent i in the queue of edge e. It
follows that agent i’s total delay is defined by equality
Ci(pi) =
∑
e∈pii
wi,e(pi) + de.
If, on one edge, some agents arrive at the same exact time step, then these
synchronous agents are ordered in the edge’s queue by tie-breaking priority ≻.
Section 3 shows how to compute, given a strategy profile, the total delays.
A rational agent, given an adversary strategy-profile, individually optimizes
its total delay. This rationality assumption induces standard concepts:
Definition 2. Given agent i and adversary strategy-profile pi−i, strategy πi is a
best-response if and only if: Ci(πi,pi−i) = minpi′
i
∈Pi {Ci(π′i,pi−i)} .
Definition 3. A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is a strategy-profile pi ∈ P where
∀i ∈ N, ∀π′i ∈ Pi, Ci(pi) ≤ Ci(π′i,pi−i).
ce
dequeue
Fig. 1. On a given edge e, agents (gray rounds) are first lined up in a FIFO queue.
The edge lets the ce first agents enter at each time-step, to travel for de time steps.
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Fig. 2. An example of a Frog where there is no PNE. Single edges have capacity one.
Double edges have capacity two. The fixed delays of edges are the numbers displayed
above. The sources (resp. sinks) of agents are indicated by squares (resp. diamonds).
Choose any tie breaking priority compatible with 2 ≻ 3∼4 ≻ 1 ≻ 5∼6 ≻ 7∼8.
Agent one Pursuer and two Evader have two strategies; the others have only one.
In plain words, strategy-profile pi ∈ P is a PNE if no agent has an individual
incentive to deviate from his current strategy, hence if every agent plays a best-
response. To illustrate the definitions above we recall (Fig. 2) a didactic variation
of a known counter-example [WHK14, Fig. B.11], which implies Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. In a Frog, there may not exist any PNE [WHK14].
Proof (Theorem 1). Recall that in a pursuer-evader game, the two agents have
two corresponding strategies; the pursuer prefers to decide the same; the evader
prefers to decide differently; and consequently there is no PNE. In Fig. 2, all
agents are degenerate(j), but agent one Pursuer and agent two Evader, who can
decide between two paths: up or down. Agents three and four transmit from
Evader to Pursuer a positive externality for deciding the same, and agents five
to eight, from Pursuer to Evader, a negative externality.
If both agents decide the same, without loss of generality path up, then
Evader makes agent three wait one time-step, who in turn arrives one step after
Pursuer where they could have collided; hence the total delay of Pursuer is 12.
Also, Pursuer makes agent five arrive at time step 10 instead of 9 on the possible
(j) A degenerate agent only has one strategy, but can still incur and cause externalities.
collision point with Evader. Moreover, agent seven also arrives there at time 10.
Consequently, this queue is congested by five and seven and Evader waits one
time-step. So Evader’s total delay is 13. Similarly, one can show that when they
decide different strategies, Pursuer’s total delay is 13, and Evader’s is 12. To
conclude, Fig. 2 is a pursuer-evader game, and so has no PNE. ⊓⊔
Definition 4. We study this sequence of computational problems.
Frog/Delays: Given a Frog Γ and a strategy-profile pi, compute the
total delays (C1(pi), . . . , Cn(pi)) of every agent.
Frog/Br/Opt: Given a Frog Γ , an agent i, and an adversary strategy-
profile pi−i, compute a best-response πi for agent i.
Frog/Br/Dec: Decision version of Frog/Br/Opt. Given a Frog Γ ,
an agent i, an adversary strategy-profile pi−i, and an in-
teger threshold κ ∈ N≥0, decide whether there exists a
strategy πi with cost Ci(πi,pi−i) ≤ κ.
Frog/NE/Verif: Given a Frog Γ and a strategy-profile pi, decide whether
strategy-profile pi is a PNE.
Frog/NE/Exist: Given a Frog, decide whether it admits a PNE.
The representation size of Frogs is a polynomial of numbers |V | and n. We
assume that the following concepts are common knowledge: decision problem,
length function, complexity classes P, ZPP, NP, coNP, ΣP2 , Π
P
2 , PH, NPO and
APX, polynomial-time reduction, L-reduction, hardness and completeness.
3 Mapping Strategy-Profiles to Total-Delays
Strikingly, the mapping from strategy-profiles to payoffs is not well defined under
local priorities, when there are directed cycles of length zero [HPSVK16]. Under
FIFO priorities with a tie-breaking order, we show the following.
Theorem 2. The mapping from strategy-profiles to total-delays is well defined,
and there is (c) a polynomial-time algorithm to compute it: Frog/Delays ∈ P.
Proof. This proof relies on Alg. 1 that is made deterministic by order ≻. Al-
gorithm 1 sequentially performs events, Dijkstra-like, along time. Type θqueue
events are when the agent is lined-up at the queue’s tail. Type θpop events are
when the agent pops from the queue’s head and starts the fixed transit delay on
edge e. An event is a quadruplet (t, θ, i, e) that occurs on edge e ∈ E when agent
i ∈ N performs an event of type θ ∈ {θqueue, θpop} at time t ∈ N≥0. As Alg. 1
iterates, time goes forward. Heap E is the set of next events for the agents that
did not finish their path. The events in heap E are ordered according to time t
(lowest first), then type θ (θqueue before θpop), and then agent i’s priority (high
priority first). Then, the overall next event is the top of the heap top(E), and can
be removed by pop(E). For every edge e, queue qe is maintained as agents line-up
using push-back(qe, i) and pop using pop(qe). For every path πi, we can access
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for mapping strategy-profiles to total-delays.
Input: Frog Γ , strategy-profile pi. Output: Total delays C1(pi), . . . , Cn(pi).
Variables: Heap of events E , queues qe on every edge e, integer results C1, . . . , Cn.
1: E ←
⋃
i∈N{(0, θqueue, i,first(pii))}
2: while E 6= ∅ do
3: (t, θ, i, e)← top(E) and pop(E)
4: if θ = θqueue then
5: push-back(qe, i)
6: E
insert
←−−−−
(
t+ ⌊ |qe|−1
ce
⌋, θpop, i, e
)
7: else if θ = θpop then
8: pop(qe)
9: if e = last(pii) then
10: Ci ← t+ de
11: else
12: E
insert
←−−−− (t+ de, θqueue, i,next(pii, e))
13: end if
14: end if
15: end while
16: return C1, . . . , Cn.
first edge first(πi), last edge last(πi), and given an edge e ∈ πi, e 6= last(πi), we
can access the next edge next(πi, e).
A queuing event (t, θqueue, i, e) develops into the popping event where agent
i leaves queue qe to start the fixed-delay. Crucially, when this queuing event is
performed, we know that no further agents can be lined-up prior to agent i in
queue qe, since it’s the heap’s top, which optimizes time and priority. Also, type
θqueue goes before type θpop, so that current congestion is counted. Hence, we
know that agent i will spend time wi,e(pi) = ⌊ |qe|−1ce ⌋ in the queue. A θpop event
generates either the queuing event after delay de, or total delay Ci.
There are at most 2|V | events per-agent. Moreover |E| ≤ n. Consequently,
Alg. 1 is in polynomial-time O(n|V | log2(n)). It was tested in detail under C++.
It adapts to weighted agents by calculation of the weighted length of queues. ⊓⊔
4 Inapproximability of Best-Responses
Theorem 2 implies that problem Frog/Br/Opt is somewhere inside class NPO,
and problem Frog/Br/Dec in class NP. In this section, we show that comput-
ing a best-response is hard, and provide two inapproximability results.
Theorem 3. Decision problem Frog/Br/Dec is NP-complete.
So, a polynomial-time algorithm addressing Frog/Br/Dec is unlikely to exist.
u0 u1 u2 . . . uM−1 uM
b1@[0,M [ b2@[0,M [ b3@[0,M [ . . . bM@[0,M [
b1 ×M b2 ×M b3 ×M . . . ×M bM ×M
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Fig. 3. Filter: Agent y is not delayed, but agent x is delayed by at least M ∈ N≥1 steps.
Circles, rectangles and diamonds are resp. vertices, sources and sinks. The idea is that
agent x waits one step on every edge (ui, ui+1), but y does not wait. After symbol @ is
the source’s starting time. An agent bi starts for every i ∈ [1,M ] and t ∈ [0,M [, hence
the number of agents is in Θ(M2). The edges have capacity one and fixed-delay zero.
Priority ≻ satisfies y ≻ bi ≻ x, for any i (and time) defined in the Figure.
Theorem 4. Optimization problem Frog/Br/Opt is APX-hard.
Hence, a PTAS for Frog/Br/Opt would imply a PTAS for every NPO problem
that admits a poly.-time constant factor approx. algorithm, which is unlikely.
Theorem 5. For any ε ∈ R>0, approximating problem Frog/Br/Opt within
factor |V | 16−ε, and within factor n 17−ε, are NP-hard.
In plain words, it would take an intractable amount of time for an agent to find
a path within factor |V | 17 or n 18 of the shortest delay. A more realistic model
may rather drop rationality, and be better based on agents using heuristics.
Before the proofs, a good rule of thumb to distinguish between easy and
hard path problems, is whether Bellman’s Principle of Optimality is satisfied, or
if preference inversions violate the principle(k). We introduce a gadget game(l).
Definition 5. An (M, t)-Backfire is a piece of Frog, defined as in Fig. 4.
Lemma 1. In an (M, t)-Backfire, if agent x arrives on the t-trigger at time t,
then on the bomb, M agents arrive at time t+ 1, and massively delay agent x.
Otherwise, if x arrives at a different time, then this Backfire does not delay x.
Furthermore, the backfire contains Θ(M) vertices and Θ(M2) agents.
Proof (Lemma 1). If agent x does not trigger on time t, then agent r1 makes
every agent bi wait one step. Hence, every agent bi collides on ui at t+2 with M
agentsmi who have priority. Agents bi finally arrive on w3 at time t+1+M , way
too late to delay anyone (assuming large M). If agent x triggers on time t, then
he gets queued after agent r0, and agent r1 has to wait one step. Then agent
r1 arrives too late on vertices ui to delay any agent bi. Consequently, agents bi
arrive on ui one step before mi, don’t get delayed, and arrive on w3 at t+1. ⊓⊔
(k) This assertion is only a rule of thumb, since no state-space is actually precised.
(l) A busy reader can, after a quick look to Fig. 4, jump straight to Lem. 2.
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Fig. 4. An (M, t)-Backfire, where M ∈ N≥1 is some large number and t ∈ N≥0 is a
time-step. Circles, rectangles and diamonds are resp. vertices, sources and sinks. After
symbol @ is the source’s starting time. The edges that are plainly depicted (or dashed)
have capacity one and fixed-delay zero. The filter is depicted in Fig. 3. Let priority
≻ satisfy ri ≻ mj ≻ bk ≻ x, for any i, j, k defined in the figure. One can connect to
any digraph from the trigger to the bomb, if the minimum delay from w2 to w3 is one.
Agent x gets heavily delayed on the bomb if and only if he uses the trigger on time t.
Definition 6. An M -Backfire is a sequence of (M, t)-Backfires, for 0 ≤ t ≤M ,
that share the same trigger-edge and bomb-edge. Agent r0 is removed everywhere
but for t = 0, because for t ≥ 1, its role in the (M, t)-Backfire is played by r1
from the (M, t− 1)-Backfire. (There is one r1 per-time-step in [0,M ].)
Lemma 2. With an M -Backfire, agent x is massively delayed on the bomb-edge
(assuming largeM), if and only if he crosses the trigger-edge (anytime in [0,M ]).
Furthermore, the backfire contains Θ(M2) vertices and Θ(M3) agents.
Proof (Lemma 2). Assume that agent x triggers on time t; all subsequent agents
r1 get delayed by one: an (M, t
′)-Backfire gets triggered for every t′ ≥ t. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 3). Membership in class NP follows from Th. 2. We show
NP-hardness by starting the reduction from decision problem MinVertex-
Cover [Kar72, GJ79] that asks, given graph G = (V , E) and threshold κ ∈ N≥0,
whether there is a subsetW ⊆ V such that ∀{ϕ1, ϕ2} ∈ E , ϕ1 ∈ W or ϕ2 ∈ W ,
and |W| ≤ κ. Recall that problemMinVertexCover is NP-complete even for
degrees bounded above by three [GJS74], which we assume here. We build the
Frog depicted in Fig. 5. The reduction’s validity is by construction (see the
figure’s caption). Taking M = 6η is sufficient. Since there are Θ(η) edges in V ,
the reduction makes Θ(η3) vertices and Θ(η4) agents, which is polynomial. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 4). Starting from the optimization version of problemMinVer-
texCover where one must find W∗ ∈ argminW⊆V {|W| | ∀ǫ ∈ E , W ∩ ǫ 6= ∅}
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“Edges {ϕ2, ϕ4} and {ϕ2, ϕ5} shall be covered, or a backfire will heavily delay agent x.”
Fig. 5. From MinVertexCover (degrees bounded above by 3) to Frog/Br/Dec.
Circles, squares and diamonds depict respectively vertices, sources and sinks for Frog.
Let η = |V| and observe that the starting size is in Θ(η). In the depiction, η = 5. The
idea is a correspondence between W ∈ 2V and path pix decided by agent x: taking edge
(vi, wi) in path pix amounts to take vertex ϕi in subset W. Every edge is associated
with (ce, de) = (1, 1), but edges (vi, wi) with (1, 2), and edges (vi, wi) when it’s a
trigger with (1, 0) (because agent r1 already makes x wait one step). Consequently
going up always takes two steps, and going down one step if it’s not a backfired edge..
Hence a vertex cover W of size k corresponds to a path pix with length 3η + k. So,
threshold κ in MinVertexCover is reduced to κ′ = 3η + k in Frog/Br/Dec. For
every edge {ϕi, ϕj} (i < j) in MinVertexCover, we introduce an M -Backfire with
trigger (vi, wi) and bomb (vj , wj), in order to heavily punish x for not taking ϕi and
ϕj . The backfire splits the provided punishement between up to three neighbors.
(forget about κ and κ′), the same reduction as for Th. 3 is also an L-reduction(m)
[PY91, Cre97], which we show by exhibiting functions f, g and constants α, β.
Recall that optimization problemMinVertexCover is APX-complete even
for degrees bounded above by three [PY91, AK97], which we still assume. The
correspondences f and g are depicted in the caption of Fig. 5. Given a Min-
VertexCover instance I, one has OPTFrog(f(I)) ≤ αOPTVC(I) for α = 10
and |W| ≤ βCi(πx) where W = g(I, πx) for β = 1. Indeed, for the former,
observe that a vertex can cover at most three edges; hence η3 ≤ OPTVC(I).
Correspondence 3η + OPTVC = OPTFrog then yields α = 10. The later comes
from k ≤ 3η + k. Consequently, this is an L-reduction and then, optimization
problem Frog/Br/Opt is APX-hard. ⊓⊔
Proof (Sketch, Th. 5). Problem MinColoring, given graph G = (V , E), asks
a coloring of G, i.e. a partition of V into disjoint sets V1, V2, . . . , Vk such that
each Vi is an independent set of G (no edges in G[Vi]), with minimum chromatic
number k = χ(G). Let η = |V|. It is known that whatever ε > 0, approximating
χ(G) within η1−ε is NP-hard [FK96, Zuc06]. The idea of the reduction is in Fig.
6, and (with M = 3η) involves Θ(η6) vertices and Θ(η7) agents. Consequently,
better approximation ratios than |V | 16−ε or n 17−ε contradict intractable ratio
η1−ε from [FK96]. ⊓⊔
(m) An L-reduction is a poly.-time reduction in NPO, which conserves approximations.
vi,γ → v
′
i,γ
vi,η → v
′
i,ηv1,η → v
′
1,η
v1,γ → v
′
1,γ
v1,1 → v
′
1,1 vi,1 → v
′
i,1
vi+1,γ → v
′
i+1,γ vη−1,γ → v
′
η−1,γ vη,γ → v
′
η,γ
vη,η → v
′
η,η
v1,γ → v
′
1,γ
Backfire on neighbors
Discount on non-neighbors
vertices
co
lo
rs
x x
1 0 M 0
Fig. 6. Sketch of reduction from MinColoring to Frog/Br/Opt. Agent x’s paths
correspond to deciding a color γ for each vertex i. Depicted in the gray rectangle, the
first time x chooses color γ is on vertex i (first time on the line). Then (1) x waits one
step on edge (vi,γ , v
′
i,γ) (because of an agent r1). Then on the same line, (2) neighbors
in G are Backfired (can’t put the same color on a neighbor) and non-neighbors are
discounted to delay zero (by heavily delaying agents r1 and disarming their eventual
backfires). Transit edges (dotted) have delay one to allow for backfires to work. Hence,
a valid coloring of size k would correspond to a path pix of length η+ k which does not
enable to find β for an L-reduction. Therefore, to bring the correspondence back from
affine to linear, we technically multiply all the costs by M , with M times more agents
and vertices, but not on the dotted edges.
5 The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section, we first observe that the verification problem Frog/NE/Verif
is coNP-complete. Then, we completely characterize the complexity of the exis-
tence problem as complete for the second level of PH(n).
Theorem 6. Problem Frog/NE/Verif is coNP-complete [WHK14, Almost](g).
Proof (Theorem 6). A deviation is a no-certificate verifiable in polynomial-time
by Alg. 1, hence this problem is inside class coNP. A proof with bottleneck
objectives lies in [WHK14, Cor. 4], and the authors claim [WHK14, Sec. 7] that
one can obtain NP-hardness for sum-objectives in the same way. We confirm
that claim since the same reduction as for Th. 3 holds here. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. Problem Frog/NE/Exist is ΣP2 -complete.
Proof (Theorem 7). This problem is in class ΣP2 . Indeed, yes-instances admit
a certificate verifiable by an NP-oracle: by guessing the right strategy-profile,
according to Th. 6, one can use an NP-oracle to verify that it is a PNE. The
ΣP2 -hardness proof below generalizes the reduction introduced for Th. 3.
In Fig. 7, we reduce decision problem MaxMinVertexCover to the com-
plement of Frog/NE/Exist. Given set of indices I, the vertices of graph G =
(V , E) partition into V = ⋃i∈I Vi,0 ∪ Vi,1. Given function θ : I → {0, 1} (i.e. 2|I|
(n) Class ΣP2 are the problems that nest a coNP problem inside an NP problem.
Only very small sizes (/ 10) of such problems can usually be practically addressed.
V1,1
V1,0
V2,1
V2,0
Vi,1
Vi,0
V|I|,1
V|I|,0
θ θ
b b b b
b b b b
x Figure 2
b>1+n+κ
x
Fig. 7. Reduction from MaxMinVertexCover to the complement of
Frog/NE/Exist. Generalizes the reduction in Fig. 5. Each box Vi,j is made as
in Fig. 5. We create a universally indifferent agent θ who can early decide between
two paths for every i ∈ I , : one backfires Vi,0’s entry and the other backfires Vi,1’s
entry. Agent θ models function θ by blocking early the entries to Vi,0 xor to Vi,1 with
the backfires b. Plain edges have capacity and cost (ce, de) = (1, 0). Dotted edges have
(ce, de) = (1, 1) but the two first ones (1, 2), to let θ run in front of x. Then agent x
decides a path through what corresponds to subgraph G(θ). Agent x sends backfires to
Fig. 2 if and only if he reaches his sink after time 1 + n+ κ.
possibilities), let G(θ) denote the graph restricted to vertices V(θ) = ⋃i∈I Vi,t(i).
Problem MaxMinVertexCover, given threshold κ ∈ N≥0, asks whether:
∀θ : I → {0, 1}, ∃W ⊆ V(θ), W vertex-covers G(θ) and |W| ≤ κ, (1)
and is ΠP2 -complete (i.e. co-Σ
P
2 -complete); co-Frog/NE/Exist asks whether:
∀pi ∈ P , There exists an individual deviation from pi. (2)
[Eq. (1) ⇒ Eq. (2)] Whatever the choices of agent θ, if the strategy of agent
x costs more than Ci > 1 + n+ κ, then he can deviate and improve, because of
Eq. (1); otherwise, now assuming that x’s strategy is a best-response, then he
reaches his sink before time 1+n+ k (because Eq. (1)) and does not disable the
example from Fig. 2, which remains unstable: there is a deviation.
[not Eq. (1) ⇒ not Eq. (2)] If there exists a function θ, then we position
agent θ as such. Then the best-response of agent x makes him reach his sink
after time 1 + n+ κ. Consequently, Fig. 2 is disabled: we have a PNE. ⊓⊔
6 The Price of GPS
Previous sections show how strong an assumption rationality is. Instead, we
propose a model inspired by GPS personal navigation assistants: agents retrieve
instantaneous traffic data to recompute shortest paths at each crossroad.
We introduce a GPS-agent as an agent who at each vertex (between two
time steps) recalculates a shortest path according to the fixed delays de plus
congestion ⌊ |qe|
ce
⌋ of the past step. In place of PNE, let O ⊆ P be the set of
strategy-profiles that can be obtained by GPS-agents. We study the worst-case
ratio to coordination, defined for one Frog as the Price-of-GPS (navigation):
PoGPS =
maxpi′∈O { C(pi′) }
minpi∈P { C(pi) } ,
u00
u01 v00
v01
u11
u10v11
v10
u20
u21v20
v21
u31
u30 v31
v30
i1
i2
o1
o2
Fig. 8. Double cycle of infinite procrastination. The idea is that there is an inner-cycle
and an equivalent outer-cycle. Agents from a cycle have to go through the other cycle
to reach their sink, but the information that they get from the other cycles does not
discourage procrastination. Circles are nodes. Every edge e has capacity ce = 1. The
four edges in every corner have fixed-delay de = 0, and the two from each corner to
the next one, fixed-delay de = 1. There are two inner-agents i1 and i2, with resp.
sources u11 and u31, and a sink reachable instantly by the dotted edges from the outer
cycle’s vertices v00, v10, v20, v30. However, they can decide to stay on the inner-cycle
u0−, u1−, u2−, u3−. There are two outer-agents o1 and o2, with resp. sources v21 and v01,
and sinks reachable by the dotted edges from inner vertices u00, u10, u20, u30. However,
they can decide to cycle on the outer-cycle v0−, v1−, v2−, v3−. On the figure, we show
w.l.o.g. current positions of the agents and the congestion from the last step in gray
rectangles. The current choice faced by agent i1 is depicted with double edges.
where C(pi) =
∑
i∈N Ci(pi). For a family of Frogs, PoGPS is the supremum of
every PoGPS therein. As shown in Fig. 8, a first negative result follows:
Theorem 8. Allowing walks(i), GPS-agents may cycle infinitely (Fig.8).
Proof. As depicted in Fig.8, consider w.l.o.g. the end of a given time step, and
the current choice faced by agent i1. Straight outside shows congestion and is
not better than taking the later exit at the next node. Since every agent faces
the same choice and the game is symmetric, it is possible to loop endlessly. ⊓⊔
Following Th. 8, we now focus on simple-paths and study the order of PoGPS.
Theorem 9. The Price of GPS Navigation is in Ω(|V | + n) as the number of
vertices |V | and the number of agents n grow(o).
Proof. It suffices to generalize the double cycle of Fig. 8 from 4 corners and
agents, to a similar double cycle with more corners and agents. Then for every
agent, while the shortest path has total-delay in Θ(1), the decided path can have
total-delay in Θ(|V |) and Θ(n). ⊓⊔
(o) For two variables x, y, Landau notation f(x, y) ∈ Ω(g(x, y)) is defined as:
∃K ∈ R>0, ∃n0 ∈ N≥0, ∀x, y ≥ n0, f(x, y) ≥ Kg(x, y).
7 Prospects
The symmetric case seems usually well behaved [HMRT09, Th.1] and would be
worth investigating. Time expanded graphs, where one does the cross product of
vertices and time or positions may yield an other beautiful approach. A study on
tie-breaking under FIFO is motivated by its importance in the proofs. Studying
less extreme, average, or sub-cases would be appealing. Extensive forms with
decisions on each node [CCCW17b] are a promising model. Finally, one could
study the impact of new technologies of IP, like video streaming.
Acknowledgments I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their work.
Following recent practices, the reviews will be appended to a preprint.
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